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ABSTRACT
Section I of this paper develops a model of income insurance in the
labor market. The model differs from those of previous analyses in its
focus on quantitative implications regarding the degree to which wages
diverge from marginal value products, both in time—series and in cross—
section data. Sections II and III present empirical evidence consistent
with these implications. The main empirical finding is that of short—
term divergence, but long—term equality between wages and marginal value
products. The labor market appears to differ from an auction market only
in the short run, but this short—run divergence considerably reduces the
potential variability of employees' realized wealth.
Professor James N. Brown
Department of Economics
Princeton University
Princeton, New Jersey 08540
(609) 452—4042I.Ep1oyee Risk Aversion, Income Uncertainty, and Optical Labor Contracts
Recent efforts to explain the exIstence of layoffs and the cyclical
stability of real wages have focused renewed interest on the voluntary
nature of involuntary uneployent and on the equilibrium characteristics
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of what appear to be non—siarket--clearng situations.One result of
these efforts has been the development of a class of models focusing on
employee aversion to earnings variance as the root cause of these phencena.
Analyses within this class typically assume that employees are averse to
variability in their consumption, that employee consumption is not
iadependent of realized employee income, and that emnloyees are less able
than enloyerstodiversify their sources ofinccme,or thatemloyee3
aresimply morerisk—aversethan ermlcyers. TheimplIcationofthese
assumutions is that both parties can benefit frarraiements vhich
shift inconevariabilityfrom cmployecs to rnpioycr, andth
developedis that these income—stabilizing arran;emer.ts entailtheuse cf
2 layoffs as a nesofadjuotin employment.
Accordingto this argument, wages are allowed to dIverge from marginal
valueproducts in order to reduce earnings variance for employees. In periods
of high demand, fIrms pay employees less than the value of their marginal
product, while in periods of low demand, wages exceed marginal value products.
As a result, because wages do not equate employees' supply of labor with
fis' demand for labor in states of low demand, supplementary adjustment
of employment by way of layoffs becomes necessary in such states.
One partlculari', interesting Implication of most such analyses
is the optimali:y of contracts whIch soeclfy state—invariant earnings
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for emPloyed workers.At first glance this result is surprisIng, for2
economists seldom find reason to argue that prices are better left
unresponsive to states oE demand, even when there exist costs associated
with price variability. On closer inspection, however, the result becomes
transparent, for while introducing costs of wage variabilit. through
employee risk aversion, these analyses introduce no counterbalancing
costs of wage rigidity.
A central assumotion in these analyses is the absence ofany allocative
\function performed by wages once an initial sorting of workersacross fir
has taken place. Specifically, this absence results from theassumption
that the costs of interfirm labor mobility aresufficiently high relative
to the value of moving between firms that no such iriterfirm movementever
takes place. Clearly this assumptionguarantees the optimality of state—
invariant earnings for emloyed workers, for it eliminatesany reason for
wage variability after the initial sorting has taken place. By precluding
any effect of -ealized wages on the realized Interfirm distribution of the
labor force, that assumption precludes as wellany. consideration of the
influence of that effect on the optimal wage policy. PerformIngno cx post
allocative function, wages are left free to be determined by othercriteria
4
such as earnings variance.
While the absence of cx post interfirm labor mobility might bean
acceptable assumption for analyzing the optimal degree of insurance against
shifts in aggregate product demand when relative product demandsare certain,
relaxing this assumption is essential for any study of optimal income insur—
ance in the presence of relative demand uncertainty. Clearly, it Isnecessary
also for any study of voluntary labor ncbility or of the effect of income
insurance on voluntary labor nobility.
This section develops a model of the optimalincome—insuring charac-
teristics of labor contracts which extends previous analyses inone funda—3
mental respect: the model considers relative changes in product demandamong
firmsandrelaxes the assumption that there is no wage—responsive interfirm
labor mobility after an initial sorting of workers across firms has taken
place. By allowing the ex post supply of labor realized by firms to depend
on the expostwages offered by firms,themodel developed in this paper
allows explicit consideration of the resource misallocation that is caused
by attempts to reduce the dispersion of employee earnings over states of
product demand. Consideration of this cost of wage rigidity leads to results
which differ from those of earlier analyses. In this model the exact wage
and employment policies offered by firms are determined by a tradeoff
between the value of variable wages and eoloyment in allowing efficient
resource allocation and the cost of variable wages and employment in
creatIng income uncertainty for employees. Variable wages become
necessary for optimal resource allocation, and because realized state—
contingent wages offered by firms mayonceagain influence the ex post
interfirm distributIon of the labor force, ootimal wages maynolonger
be determIned simply by employee aversion to earnings variance. This
extension is of more than theoretical interest, for it leads to explicit,
quantitative expressions for the optimal response of wages and employment
to variations in product demand that can be applied in scmeching more
than a loose, qualitative fashion and which can provide a basis for an
empirical test of the theory.
The, following analysis focuses on a single contractIng period,
during which firms experience random shocks to the demands for their
products, and during which firms employ workers who dislike the prospect of
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uncertaIn earnings. It assumes that workers sort themselves among firms
at the start of the period on the basis of the labor cctracts, explicit
or implicit, which firms offer.These contracts are assumed to specify wages4
and layoff probablities (arid imply quit probabilities) contingent on the
distribution of product demand among firms which is realIzed.
During the first part of the contracting period, each firm receives
a certain price for its product and pays certain wages to its employees.
After a given interval, however, all firms experience shocks to the demands
for their products and may respond to this new situation with layoffs,
additional hires, or wage revisions, leading to some level of quits aong
their employees. For simplicIty the analysis focuses on a single firm,
assumed to be insignificant in the market, and abstracts from general equilibrium
considerations.
The firm is assumed to maximize the value of profits expected over
all states of product deand by choosing the number of workers with
whom contracts are made at the start of the pericd arid by choosing values
for wages, layoffs, non—wage ayments to laid—off workers, and additional
hires corresponding to each possible state of product demand. The firm
is assumed to survive forever and to know the manner in which quits by
its employees and applications for employment from workers initially
at other firms respond to the wages which it offers in each state.
Constraining the firm's efforts to maximize expected profit are the
profit—maximizing activIties of other firmsandthe efforts of workers to
maximize their utility. In order to attract workers at the star of the
period, the firm must offer an expected value of earnings which, adjusted
for income uncertainty, is at least as great as that available at other firms.
And in order to achieve the desired level of employment once the new distri-
bution of product demand is kno, the firm must offer a new level of
earnings which is consistent with the efforts of workers to arbitrage ralizd
differences among firms in wages net of mobility costs.5
It is assumed that after the new statesof demand for firms'products
become known, employees of the firm are given onedrawing from the realized
distribution of new wages paId elsewhere.If a firm is drawn which pays a
wage exceeding the value tothe employee of remaining at the initialfirm
by at least the cost of interfirmlabor mobility, a quit occurs. If an
employee chooses not to quit andif he is laid off, he is assurned to be
given some severance payment by thefirm naking the layoff and to accept
the offer of the firm previously drawn but rejected,or to be unemployed for
the remainder of the period if the firmdrawn is not offering a wage
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whichexceeds theemaloyee'S value of leisure.
More specifically, the firm's severance pay policyis assumed to
guarantee a certain level of incomefor all employees laid off in a given
state.Thislevel may var'; with the state of demand forthe firm's
product, but given any partIcularrealized level of demand,the firm is
assumed to pay all employees laid off the differencebetweenthe net earnings
which they realize attheirnext best alternative and the guaranteed income
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for the specific state of demand realized.
More precisely, the firm is assumed to maxImize
(1) PF(N)—
+t(P(s)F[N(s) (l-(s) )+h(s) 1-N(s) (1-2(s) )w(s)-N(s)(s) g(s)-(s)]-h(s) (s) ()
S
subjectto thelabor supply constraints
(2)W+Z( fu(s)-L(w(s)) ]N(s) (l-(s))+N(s)Y(S) g(s)-L(g(s))1+(1-N(s(s)-L(S) Ih(s)
s N N N q q
(3) u(s)j(h(s)), '>O6
by choosing N, h(s), w(s), J(s) and g(s)>0 for all s, where:
P denotestheinitial certain product price
PC) denotesthefirm's production function, F'0, F"<O
N denotes thefii•m's initial work force
Wdenotesthe initial certaInwage paidby the firm
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g indexesthe state of demand for thefirms product
P(s)denotes the product price obtainIng in state s
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N(s)denotes the number of employees who do not quit thefirm in state s.
i(s)denoteslayoffs in state s, ecpressed as a fraction of workers ho do
notquitin state s, and assumed to be randoly distributedamong workers
who do notquit in states
h(s) denotes additional hires in states
t(s)denotes the wage paid by thefirm in states
g(s)denotes tilelevelof income guaranteed to employees laid off in state s
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w(g) denotes the expected netlevel of earnings available else.'here to em?lo'ees I laid off in state s
ii(s) denotes thewagepaid to additional hires in state s
ir()denotesthe probability distribution function for future states of demand
L() denotes the monetary value of the utility loss per employee caused by
deviations of realized inc6me in state s from its ex ante mean level 11
12 v(s) denotes the exected net levelof earnings available elsewhere to employees
qwho quit in state 3
L(s)denotesthe expected value of Ehe function L() for thoseworkers
13
qwho quit in state s
2 denotes theexpectedvalue of risk—adjusted earnings available else-
where to initIal employees.7
Substituting labor supply constraints (2) arid (3) into thefir&s
objective(1), the firm'sproblem can be written in amore revealing form
as choosing t, h(s), w(s), g(s) arid i(s)tomaximize
(4)PF(N)—NcH-t(P(s)F(N(g) (—1(s))+h(s) ]—(s) (1—)(s))L(w(s))
S
[(s)—L(g(s)) ]+(N—N(s)) (w (s)—L (s) ]—.i(s)h(s)r(s)
q q
Expression (4) shows that the firm's maximization problem nvclves a
tradeoff between the effectsofthe firm's choIce variables •on the income
uncertainty associated with the firm's contact and the effects of those
variables on the expected net earnings of the firm arid its initIal emloyees
considered jointly, where the ecpeccation is taken over all possible future
relocations of the firm's initial work force. Roughly tated, the firm
can reduce income uncertainty for its employees by reducing the extent to
which wages reflect marginal value products. But it can do soonly at
the cost of lower expected joint net earnings, becauseany gap between
rgInal value products and wages reduces the efficiency of volunca labor
mobility, and because layoffs or additional hires cannot eliminate this
inefficiency without creating greater costs of their own.The implications
ofthis tradeoff for the extent to which wages and en1oymenz respondto
changes in the dis:ribudon of product demand can be seen fran the first—
order conditions for the firm's maximization problem. The optimal neber
of contracts offered by the firm at the start of the period arid the fIrm's
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(9) O>(c(s)—?(s)F' (s)+L(w(s))—L(g(s)) ]N(s)
+([P(s)F'(s)—X(s)+L(X(s))-L(w(s)fl [l_(s)]+(s)[L(X(s))—L(g(s))]]dN(s)
d)(5)
wherestrict equalities hold for all non—zero values of the relevant variables.
Condition (5) is equivalent to the restriction that the narginal expected
profit from additions to the firm's initial work force be zero. More interest-
ingly, this condition requires that the expected (over all possible future
relocations of the firm's initial work force) net risk—adjusted incone of
the firm and its Initial employees taken jointly be equal to that expected at
otherfirms.Applied more generally, condition (5) guarantees that the
initial sorting of workers across fIrms will be optimal in the sense that noinitial reallocation could increase the expected net risk—adjusted product
of all firms taken together.14
Given thatcondition(5) is satIsfied, condition (6)—(9) deter-minethe
optimalres:onse of income and erloyment to changes in the distribution of
product demand. Consider first condition (6). Condition (6) requires that
themarginal value oroduct and marginal factor cost of additional hires in
states be equal if any hiring takes place in state s. Through this
condition, the availability of additional hires to the firminfluences the
optimalcharacteristics of the firm's contract in r'o ways. First, the
elasticIty of the sucply curie of additional hires to the firm influences the
relation between the price of the firm's product and the margInalvalue product
ofthe firm's employees. Second, variability in theOSit1Oflof that supply
curveintroduces an additional source of variation in the firm's demand for
theservicesofitsinitial work force.
If the s.pply curve of additIonal hires to the firm were perfectly elastic
and stable, then regardless of the volatility of demand forthefirm'sproduct,
therecould be no uncertainty about the marginal value product of the firm's
employees. Alternatively, even if the price of the firm's product wereper-
fectly certain, there stIll could be uncertainty about the marginal value
product of employees If variability in the demand for other firms' products
caused variability in the supply price of additional hires to the firm. in
general, for any given variability in the price of the firm's product, the
corresponding variability in the marginal value product of the fIrm's employees
would be less, the more elastic the supply curve of addItional hirestothe
firmand the more the position of thatcurve variedto offset the effect of
changesin product price.
ConditIon (6) can be seen as a determInant of the state dIstributIont -
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of the firm'sdemandfor the services of its iniia1 work force. Given
this distribution, conditions (7)—(9) determine the corresponding state
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distribution of income arid employment for initial employees.The exact
mariner of this determination depends on the value taken by layoffs. Two
casesarepossible. For states of product demand in which layoffs are
positive,conditions (6)—(9) jointly determine wages and employment. But
for states of product demand in which layoffs are optimally zero, conditions
(6) and (7) alone are determining.16






The first term in condition the net effect of a marginal increase
in the state—s wage on the expected joint earnings of the fIrm and its
inItial employees. This term represents the value of the margInal reduc-
tion (increase) in resource misallocation brought about by Increasing the
wage when it is belcw (above) that value whIch leads the firm's employees
to allocate theraselves across alternative employments such that, net of
mobility costs, earnings available elsewhere to the marginal employee equal
the marginal value product of employees remaining at the firm.
Arty shortfallof wages below marginal value products will cause some
workers to quit even though the value of their marginal product exceeds the
net earnings whIch they realize by quittIng. When such quits occur, the
firm loses (PF'—w) whiletheemployee gains (v—L(v)—c)—(w—L(w)). Similarly,
any surplus of wages over marginal value products will cause some workors not
to quit even though the value of theIr marginal product falls short of the11
net earnings they could realize by quitting. .Then such quits fail to occur,
the firm loses (w—?F') while the employee gains (w—L(w))—(v—L(v)—c). In
either case, the difference——that par: of the loss to the firm for which there
is no corresponding emoloyee gain——is given by (PF'—L(w))—(v—L(v)—c)[. This
loss is solely due to the divergence of wages and marginal value products
resulting from efforts to stabilize etployee income.
For the marginal employee ,v is equal to w+c, and so the marginal value
of this distortion is (PF'—w). Given a positive (negative) distortion between
marginal value products and wages, a marginal increase in the wage will dis-
courage some quits which would have resulted in a net loss (gain) to the
workers and the firm considered jointly. The contribution of this effect
to joint earnings in state s is (PF'—w)dN(v(s)), the first term in condition (10).
dw (s)
The second term in condition (10) is the (negative of the) effect of a
marginal increase in state—s wages on the risk premium which the firm must
pay to its employees. Given that employees are averse to variance Ln their
earnings, this term will be positive for values of w greater than the mean
of w, negative for values less than the mean, and zero otherwIse. Thus,
an implication of condition (10) is that wages will be set at values which
fall short of marginal value products in states of demand for which realized
earnings exceed their mean level, and at values which exceed margInal value
products in states of demand for which realized earnings fall short of their
mean.
In order to reduce income uncertainty for employees, the firm allows
wages to diverge from marginal value products. But this procedure leads t
alevel of quits which is unprofitable for the firm and its employees taken
jointly. This fact limits the extent to which the firm can optimally reduoc
empicyce income uncertainty by reducing the extent to which wages reflect/ —
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marginal value products. Optimal wages are too sticky to be fully efficient
in allocating labor, but too flexIble to eliminate incomeuncertainty for
employees.
To illustrate, consider the firm's response to an increase inproduct
price. An increase in the price of the firm's product will cause the first
term in condition (10) to increase without alterIng the second term.ConditIon
(10) indicates that the firm's optimal response will be to increaseits
wage. When product demand increases, it becomes profitable for the firm to
raIse wages in order to discourage quitsamong its em3loyees. The resulting
increase in the firm's labor force allows the fIrm to takeadvantage of
the initial excess of marginal value product overwages paid. As wages
and employ-nent are increased, however, this excess isreduced, and in addition
the firm must Increase the risk—premium paid to itsemployees. The optimal
wage for state s is deteined by margInal equality of the net gains from
additions to the firm's labor force induced by hIgher wages wIth the incre-
mental effect of higher state—s wages on the riskpremium paid by the fir-n.
For statesof demand in which layoffs are zero, condition (10) implies
a relation between wages and marginal value products of the basic form shown





Approximate Selacion Betcen Insured Wages and arginni
Val.ie Products When Layoffs are ero13
The exact form of this relation can be seen more clearly by re—expressing
condition (10) as
(II) u(s) = P(s)F'(s)
1+dL(w(s))/d1cN(s)
dw(s) /diogu(s)
It can be seen directly from condition (11)that ifthe marginal risk
premium associated with a wage increase, dL(w(s))/dw(s), increases in
absolute value as wages diverge from their mean value, or if the elasticity
of labor supoly to the firm, dlogN(s)/dlogw(s), diminishes as wages
diverge from their mean value, then wages will be less thanunit—elastic
18 inresponse to marginal value products, as drawn in Figure 1.Intuitively,
if successive employment increases recuire increasing marginalwage increases,
or if the margInal risk premium imp1ed by a wage ncrase rises as wages
are further increased, then firms will increase employment (and, by ipl±ca—
tion, wages) less readily in response to product price increases aswages
diverge further from theIr mean value. Similarly, firms will reduce employ-
ment (and, by implication, wages) less readily in response to product
price reductions if, as wages fall further below their mean value, either
the marginal wage reduction required to induce a separation or themarginal
risk premium implied by a further wage reductIon increases.
Similar reasoning suggests that firms with relatively inelastic
labor supply and relatively risk averse employees would havewage—response
schedules more closely approximating a horizontal line, while fIrms with
relatIvelyelastic labor supiyandrelatively risk neutral employees
uculdhave wage—resDonse schedules more closelyapproXImating a 5' line
through. the origin in Figure 1. Atone extreme, with zero risk aversion,
thefIrm's wage—response schedule would be givenby the 450lIne,with14
wages unIt—elasticinrelation to .argina1 value products. It is thIs
special case chat auction models of the labor market are led to. At the
other extreme, with either infinite risk aversionor :ero labor supply
elasticity, the firm's wage response furtccion would be given by a horizontal
line, with wages zero—elastic in relation to marginal valueproducts and
states of demand. It is this specIal case that previous analyses of
income—insuring labor contracts have been led to by the assumption of
zero ex—posc labor mobility. It is an advantage of thepresent analysis
that it supplies a framework broad enough toincorporate both extreme cases——
pure auction and complete insurance——and yet specific enough tosuggest the
foi of the relazin beteenwages and marginal value products ifl the
presence of income insurance.
To investigate the role of layoffs and severancepay in the fi's
optimal contract, consider first the Implications of ccridition (8) for
the supplemental payments made by the.firm toemployees laid off in State s.
Condition (8) requires that the firmguarantee all emoloyees laid off in
state s a level of income such that, at the margin, the benefits fromsuch
payments in reducing income uncertainty equal the Implied loss injoint
net income resulting from the deterrant effect ofseverance pay on quits.
If quits were unaffected by severancepay, the firm would choose a level
of layoff benefits such that employees'expected income was unaffected by
the prospect of layoffs. That is, the firm wouldguarzntee all laid—off
employees a level of income equal to their ex ante mean level ofincome,
paying each employee the difference between the ex ante mean and that
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emplovee1s realized level of income at his next—best alternative.
But to the extent that theprospect of severance pay discaurages cults,
the firm's optimal severance pay policy will failto elImInate the inccme15
loss associated with layoff status. In states of low product denat-id,
some ep1oyees whose net earnings elsewhere exceed that a: their current
job will choose not to quit because the value to thern of renaming a:
the firrn, (l—,(s))w(s)+,(s)g(s), nay exceed the wage offered at their
nextbestalternative. As a consequence, the marginal effect of severance
pay on quits will lead to a net loss in expected joint incoe which must be
balanced against the marginal value of severance pay in reducing incone
uncertaInty. Higher values for g(s) reduce income uncertainty for employees,
but only at the cost of a lower mean level of income due to the negative
effect of severance pay on the efficiency of voluntary labor nobility.
The preceding discussion of condition (8) nay seen reminIscent of the
dIscussion of cond:ion (10) and the fIrm's optimal wage policy, for the
same tradeoffs are involved in both conditions. In fact, conditions (7)
and (8) together imply that the opti1 value for the level of income that
the firm guarantees all employees laid off in state s tssImplyw(s), the
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level of income which it offers to those not laid off in state s. This
characteristic of the optimal severance pay policy has important inpl1c—
tions both for the firm's optimal layoff strategy and for the optimal
response of wages to product price reductions. SettIng g(s) equal to w(s),
and noting that with g(s) equal to w(s), dN(s)/dJ(s) becomes zero,




whIch reveal some interestIng aspects of the optInal respcnse of wages and16
layoffsto variations in product demand in states of demand for which layoffs
are non—zero.
Condition(13) shows that the firm'soptimal layoff strategy is directly
determined only by efficiency cr1teria. Becaseseverance pay allows the firm
to compensate employees for the income loss associated withbeing laid off,
itthereby allows the firm to choose its layoff strategy without being
directlyconstrained byermloyees' aversion toincome uncertainty. When
thefirmguarantees all emoloyees who do not quit in state s a certain
wage which is independent of layoff status, the direct relation between
layoffs and income uncertainty is broken. Also, quitsare no longer affected
by the prospect of layoffs, since layoffs no longer affect raalizedearnings.
As a result, the firm's layoffstrategyinvolves only a comparison between
the marginal value product of employees at the firmand the expected net value
of what randomlylaid off employees could earn elsewhere. Thefirm
22 choosesa level of layoffs in state sso as to equate these two values.
By substituting condition (13) into conditIon (12),conditIon(12)




which, although identical in form tocondition (10), is afunction only
of the wage paid by the firminstate s. There isnothing incondition (14)
to change when states of demand change. The imalication of this fact is
that once layoEfs bcccno positive, wages are made invariantto states of




dw(s) / d.'(s)- 'd
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It is interesting to note the decerm.inants of this minimu income
which the firm guarantees to its ep1oyees. Condition (13) indicates
that in response to a price decline, the firm will lay off enough workers
to raise the margna1 value product of its employees to its es:imate of
their net alternative earnIngs elsewhere. By construction, the firm has
co knowledge of any particular employees' next—best alternative and so
cannot be selective in whom it chooses to lay off.Thebest the firm can
do is to satisfy conditiori (13), realizing that some enployees not laid
off will have net earnings elsewhere which exceed those of some laid—off
employees.
In contrast, when the firm reduces its wage, it causes only those
workers who have the highest alternative net earnings to leave the firm.
However, all emplcyees must suffer the wage reductionnecessary to induce
the marginal employees to leave the firm. Although adjustment of the
firm's labor force by way of wage cutsmay be more efficient in terms
of the particular employees who are induced to leave the firm, itmay
be more costly in terms of the income varIability which it entails.
In choosing the optimal level for the minimum income which itguarantees
its employees, the firm balances at the margin theseefficiency costs
and in-come stability benefits to satisfy condition (14).
Because the marginal risk premium imp1id by a vage—inducedspara—
tion increases as wages fall below their mean value, and becausethe
relative allocative inefficiency impliedby a layoff dinishes as wages
are further reduced, layoffsmay ultinately dominate wage reductions as
a means of employment adjustment, eventhough wage reductions are Initially
23
preferred. Further, because the relatIve allocatiye inefficleriay cf
layoffs depends only on the wage paid by thefirm, once layoffs become
the preferred means of em1ovmentreductIon, they will remaIn preferredis






Figure 2 illustrates the fIrm'schoiceof wages and layoffs in
responding to product price reductions. The downward—slopingcurves are
marginal value product schedules correspondIng todifferent values of
product price (P <P <P ).Theupward—sloping curves are marginal factor
210
cost schedules corresponding to different assunptior.S about enployeerisk
aversionand different noans of separation.





schedule for the firm's initial employees, derived directly from the exosc
alternative wage distribution in the firm's initial work force. This curve
would be the marginal factor cost schedule relevant to the fi: in the
absence of employee aversion to income uncertainty. The curve labeled Cw
is derived from the MFCcurveby subtracting from it the monetary value of
the utility loss suffered by all the firm's enployees as a result of the
wage reduction implied by that point on the C curve. This curve can be
interpreted as the marginal factor cast schedule relevant to the fiwhen
employees are averse to income uncertainty and when separncions are wage—
induced. The curve labeled MFC plots the expected net wage available else-
where to employees having alternative wages lower than that given by the
correspondingpoint on the MFCcurve.This curve generates the (horizontal)
marginal factor cost schedules that would be relevant to the firm's choice
of layoffs at dIfferent levels of wages.
Starting from an initial equillbriun at point E ,considerfirst 'a
0
reduction in product price from P to P .Figure2 illustrates that the
0 1
firm's optimal response will be to reduce wages to w,adjustingemloyent
1
entirely by voluntary se?arations. At point E ,themarginal adjustnent
1
cost implied by wage—induced separation, E A, remains less than the narg±al
1
adjustment cost that would be implied by a layoff at that wage, AB. Even
thoughall employees must suffer the wage reductIon to W ,thisreduction s
1
small enough to be preferred to layoffs, given that layoffs inply relatively
great allocative ineEficiency when wages are high.
At lower values of product price, however, this need not be true.
Consider the firm's response to a price decline fronPto P .Atpoint C
0 2
it is nolongertrue that the nargin! adjustrnent cost associated withe—
inducedseoaratioa is loss than the narinal adjustrnent cost associated with
involuntary separation at that wage.Indeed, for any level of enpiovnent20
less than N, the reverse will be true. A.s the fir-n's wage falls toward the
minimumwage in themarket,the difference between what the marginal voluntary
separation could receive elsewhere and what a randomly laid—off employee could
expect to receive elsewhere diminishes. As a result, because the marginal
allocatve inefficiency associated 'thalayoff depends positively on this
difference, these adjustment costs also decline as the wage falls.
In Figure 2, at a product price of P ,thefi's equilibriu response
2
.s given by point E .Thefirm reducesits wage to w*, at whichthe
2
marginal adjustment cost implied by wage—induced separation comes to exceed
that marginal adjus:rent cost associated with a layoff at thatwage.Given
w*, the marginal exected net alternative earnings of randomly laid—off
eplcyees is fixedat thevalue of w*, and so the fi lays off emloyees
to the point at which the marginal value product of employees remaining at
the fi is brouzht into ecualitv with that value. In Figure 2, the
optimal number of layoffs corresponding to product price P is given by
2
2
It is interesting to note that for sufficiently large reductions in
product price, the presence of income insurance nay actually increase the
employnent response to. product price reductions. Consider emloyent level
N .Atthis level of employment, the fIrm's expectation of what an employee
3
randoo'iy laid off at a wage of w cquld receive elsewhere is equal to what
the marginal net alternative at that level of employment would have been
in the absence of inccme insurance. For lower levels of employment, the
margInalfactor cost relevanttothefi n the presence ofincome
insurance,*,exceedsth marginal factor cost that would apply in the
absence of income insurance. Thus, for product prices low enough tomake
employmentless than N optimal, emlo',ent in the presence of Income ns'rance
321
willbeless thanthe levelthat would have been optimal at thesame price
in the absence of Income insurance,
Correspondingly;' marginal value products
in the presence of inccme insurancecan exceed marginal value products In the
absenceof income insurance for sufficIently lowproduct prices.
Combining these results with those for states of damandin which layoffs
arecro, the implications of conditions (6)—(9) for theoptimal response
ofwages and employment to changes in prcduct pricecan be sumarized grahi—
cally as in Figure 3 below.
Figure 3 plots values of wages, marginal valueproducts, quits, layoffs,
new hires, and emPloymant corresponding toalternatIve possible ex—post values
of product price. The curves labeled "contract"refer to a firm which
supplies income insurance to its employees, while fora point of referonce,
the curves labeled "auction" referto a firmwhichsupplies no income insurance
to its employee but which is assumed to have thesame initial level of enployment.
Panel (a) of Figure 3 shows thai, forstates of demand inwhichlayoffs
are zero, the presence of income insurancereduces the response ofwagesto
variations in product demand, butcorrespondingly increases the response of
marginalvalue products to variations inproduct demand. Because income
insurance reduces wages in states ofhigh demand and increases wages instates
of low demand, the responsiveness ofquits to variations in product demand
is reduced, as shown in panel (b). Tosome extent, the firm can compensate
by increased additional hires in states ofhigh demand and by reduced addi-
tional hires n states of low demand(panel (dJ). But so long as the
marginal supply price ofadditional hIresis an increasing functIon ofaddI-
tional hires, the effect of incomeinsurancecn voluntary separations 'iil
24
not be fully offset.Thus, ir.ocma insurance wIll reduce theresonsjv,ess







Chratcrtsrics ard Irip1icatotsof Ictccm—Insurit'gL.borCrtcracts:





















N(s) (1-I(s) +h(s) (contract)23
which implies the effect onmarginalvalueproducts shown in panel (a).
For states of demand in which layoffs are non—zero, panel (a) shows
thatincome insurance leads to locally fixed levels of wages and marginal
value products. Paneltranslatesthis effect on wages into a locally
fixed level of voluntary separations, and panel (d) translates the effect
13
on.arginal value products into a locally fIxed level of additional hires.
The firm's marginal response to changes in product demnnd takes place solely
by way of layoffs in such states, as shown inpanel (c). Because layoffs
arechosen so as to maintain the marginal value product of the firs
employeesat a fixed level exceeding the minimumpossiblelevel in theabsence
of income insurance (?anel [al), emp.loyenc inth presence of income insurance
ultImately falls below that in the absnce of income insurance (panel [efl.
II.An Empirical Assessment of the Theory
-
Thepreceding analysis argues that if income—insurIng labor contracts
are present in thelabor market, thenwages should be less variable than
marginalvalue products and firms should rely on layoffs as a means of
emploentadjustr.ent in states of sufficiently low product demand. That
thisargument is at least broadly consistent with empirical observation
canbe sees from the datapresented belowin Table1.
Table1 is based on annual values of residual income, production wor:er
earnings,value—added, and average monthly layoff rates forU.S.manufacturing
industries,.95 to 1976. The firstthreecolumns of Table 1list values of
realannual residual income per production worker, real annual earnings of
productionworkers, andrealvalue—added per production worker, all exarcssec
relative to their te trends for the sampleperiod.Column four lIsts similarly
26
constructedrelatIve values for annual averages of monthly layoffrates.24
TABLE1




























1959 1.009 .999 1.019 1.040
1960—62 .914 .983 .989 1.207
1963-69 1.006 1.009 1.011 .871












1976 1.068 1.008 1.030 .956
Definition of variables and source: see Appendix
The data presented in Table 1 display two characteristics consistent
with the hypothesis that firms stabilize employee earnings. First, production
worker earnings aridresidualincome per production worker move together over
the cycle, but the variability of production worker earnings is substntia11y
less than the variability of residual income per production worker. The
meanannual absolute deviation from unityforthe series underlyIng colunone
is .082, while the corresponding valuefor column two is only .014.Also,
themean absolute vcar—to—year change for the relative values underlying
column one Is .098, ccnparcd to .017 for column two,
To put these nuiibers in conte:t, if f1rs' production fmcticnS
wereCobb—Dou1asand25
if firms offered no income insurance to their empLoyees,then the percentage
variability of annualeaings and annual residual income per employeewould
beequal, and equal also to the percentage variability orvalue—added per
employee. But if firms offered contracts thatstabi1ied the annual income
of their employees, then the percentage variabilityofresidual income per
.employeewould exceed thepercentage variability of value—added peremployee.27
For the data underlying Table 1 the standard deviations about trend for the
1ogarith of residual income per production worker, annual earnings of
production workers, and value—added per prcducton worker are .102, .013, and
.024,respectIvely. The fact that the percentage variability of residual
income per production worker exceeds the percentage vnriab±ltyofboth value—
added per production worker and production worker earnings suggests the
presence of izcomo inurance. The non—zero variabIlity of annual earnings,
however, suggests that this insurance is not complete.
The second feature of Table 1 csistent with the presence of income
insurance is the existence and signIficant (counter—) cyclical variability
of layoffs. Although not evident from Table 1, layoffs coprise a signi-
ficant fraction of total separations. The mean share of layoffs in total
separations——the mean probability or layoff conditional on separation——is
.402 for the sample period; ranging from a value of .196 in 1973 to a value
of .634 in 1958. Corresponding values of the average monthly layoff race
for those two years are .9 and 2.6, respectively.
As Table 1 shows, perIods during which residual income per productIon
wrker lIes belcw its trendvalueare characterized by small deviations of
annual earnings below trend and high values of layoffs re1atve to trend.
PerIods of relatively hIgh residual income on average display the reverse.
The averce year of relatively lcwresIdualincome (.907 of trend value)26
has production worker earnings equal to .984 of trend value and layoffs
equal to 1.199 of trend. In the average year of relatively high residual
income (1.065 of trend value), production worker earnings are 1.010 of
trend value, while layoffs are .855 of trend value.
Thesecharacteristicsappear to beirtconsistentwith an auction model
of the labor market in which wages adjust to clear the market at all times.
The auction model could explain the relative cyclical stability of earnings
by appropriate choice of labor supply and demand elasticities and by appro-
prIate assumptions about the blat distribution of shocks to labor supply
and labor demand. ut such a model would leave unexplained fis' reliance
on layoffs in reducIng employment. The data in Table 1 indicate a signi—
ficant departure, atleastin form, from an auction market, a departure which
28
can berationalizedby an appeal to risk—shifting consIderations.
But while the data in Table 1 may be qualitatively consistent with the
rIsk—shifting explanation of wage rigidity and layoffs, they may at the same
tImebequantitatively inconsistent with that explanatIon. Of particular
interest in Table 1 is the fact that the cyclical behavior of production
worker earnings differs only from the cyclical behavior of value—
added per production worker. If production functions were Cobb—Douglas,
the relative variability of value—added per production worker would equal the
relative variability of production workers' marginal value product. Theref:re,
on the assumption of Cobb—Douglas production functions, Table 1 could
imply that wages do not differ much from marginal value products, and
so castdoubton explanatIons of layoffs that rel-y on such a differonce.
Moregenerally, onthe assumption that firms' productIon Eunc:ipns are
of the constant elasticity of substItutIon (C5) for, the interretaticn of
the data in Table 1 would depend on the elasticity of substItution between
productIon workers and other factars of productian. Fcr the CS productIon27
fuctiori, thepercentage variability of residual income per production worker
wouldequalthepercentagevariability of value—added per production worker
29 iffircis supplied no incocie insurance to choir enployees.Thus, coluns one
andtwoof Table 1 would continue to suggest the presence of incone insurance.
flowever, internal consistency would require that the elasticity of substituticn
between production workers and other factors of production be less than unity.
For values of the elasticity of substitution less than one, the ralatve
variability of marginal value products would exceed the relative variability
of average value products, while for elasticIties of substItution greater
than one the reverse would be true?° Thus, Table 1would indIcate a
differencein the cyclical behavior of wages and rginal value products
if theelasticity of substitution wereless than one. It would indicate
lIttle or no difference otherwise. Depending on the value of the elasticity
of substitution, then, the data in colunn tree of Table 1 could either
suport or contradict the hypothesis that the data in coluns one, two,
and four reflect the presence of incce insurance.
Many studies have estinated production functions for U.S. anufaceuring
industries using the CES fraraework. In general, studies using tine—series
31
datahave found elasticities of substitution less than unity.One nightbe
ternpted,therefore, to conclude that the data in Table 1 support theincone
insurancehypothesis in a consistent fashion. However, because previous
estimateshave been based on the equality of wages and narginal value products,
andbecause wages may not equal ciarginal value products in the presence of
incorneinsurance, it is not clear that previous estinates of the elasticity of
substitution are valid in the presence of income insurance. Accordingly, it
seens advisable not to rely on previously estimated elasticitiesof ubs:I—
tutlonin interpreting the data In Thble 1.28
Todevelop an alternative method of estimatIon that can allow for the
presence of income insurance, consider equation (11), repeated here for
convenience
(11) w(s) = P(s)F'(s)
1 + dL(w(sfl/dloN(s)
du(s) /dlogw(s)
Interpretingthe "contractingt' period as being of one year's length, this
equazon would determine the relation between annual earnIngs and annual
marginal value products in the presence of income insurance. It is analogous
to the equilibrium condition PF' in the absence of income insurance
(equation [11]reduces to this condition in the absence of aversIon to
income uncertainty or in the presence off infinitely elastic labor supply),and
it can play tLe same role in estimation.





for values of w(s) near the ex—ante mean of w. On the further assumptions
that:(a) the supply of labor to the fIrm is of constant elasticity with
respect to annual earnings at the firm; and (b) the marginal risk premium,
dL(w(sfl/dw(g), is proportional to the logarithmic difference of w(s) from
thee:—ante mean lovelof earnings (as might be the case If enDloyees are
averroto percentage uncertainty in their earnings) ,equation(16) can b&
re..:i::cr. as29
(17)1og[w(s)J( c )log[P(s)F'(sfl --[p.)log[E
e+R c+R
where c again denotes the elasticity of labor supply to the firm, R isa easu:e
of employees' aversion to income uncertainty, and Ew is the ex—aritemean level
32
of earnings fo the firm's employees.Finally, on the assu'.pt±on that fir's





where F(s) denotes output in state $andc denotes a constant.
Interpreted in a time—series context, equation (18) suggests the following
estImating equation;
(19) log[w(t)]=c+ylog[p(t) ]+ylog[F(t)J+y[l—c]l—uJlogF(t)+(1—y) log [Ev(t) ]+u
N(c) o t
whereu is a regression disturbance term, and where y can be interpretedas an
t
elasticityof annual earnings with respect toannual marginal value products,
holdingexpected earnings constant. Ifthelabor market operated as an
auction, withemloveesalways paid the value of their margInalproduct,
then estimates of equation (19)should resultInestimated values of r
nearunity. In this case, equation (19)could be interpretedas just a
renormalized version of the Art —Chenery—jnhasSolowequation, but without
the assumtjon of constant returns to scaleand withoutthe imposed restricticn30
34
that y equal unity.Alternatively, if firms offered contracts which stabilized
employees' income in the manner assumed by equation (11), then estimates
of yshouldbe less than unity, with the difference from unity reflecting the
degree to which employees' income is stabilized by firms.Thus,at the price
of some additional assumptions about the form of employees' aversionto income
uncertainty arid about the labor supply curve facing the firm,CESproduction
functions can be estimated ma manner that allows for thepresence of income
insurance. cre importantly for the purpose at hand, these assumptionsallow
direct measurement of tho extent to which firms stabilizeemloyee income.
Presented below in Table 2 are estimates from th following version of
equation (19)
(20)log[w(t)]= t2+ylog(P(t)J+ylog(F t)J±y{1-c][l-v]lcg [F(t)J+u
01 2 a N(t) a t
where t denotes time measured in years.
TABLE 2
ESTDIATESOFEQUATION (20) FOR U.S. 1.1JFACTURING, 1954-1976:
log[w(t)]=cit+
01 2 a N(t) a v
Coefficient C i/a
0 1 2 a \)
Coefficient 2.409 —.011 —.0003 .221 .787 .055
estimate




Definition of var±5le andsource:see Apocdix31
The estimates presented in Table 2 are based on th same data as underlie
Table 1——U.S. manufacturIng industries, 1954 to 1976. In place of the varIable
Ew(t),the regression reported in Table 2 includes a quadratic tthe trend. Given
that Ew(t) is intended to reflect conditions of labor supply, whichmay be
ecpected to change only gradually over time, the use of a time trend in place
of Ew(t) seems reasonable. A quadratic functionwas chosen to allow for the
changing industrial, demographic, and skill composition of the labor fcrceover
the sample period.
The estimates in Table 2 were derived by an instrumental variables estimation
method in order tallowfor pcssible endogeneity of the explanatory variables.
Auxiliary regressions were first performed for the 1ogarith of product price,
output, and output per production worker. Fitted values from these regressicns
were then used to estimate equation (20). In additiontoa quadratic time trefld,
the auxiliarj regressions included, asexplanatory variables the logarIthms
of the current and previous year's values of:(a) net new orders for manu-
facturing establishments; and (b) an Index of helo—wantednewspaper adver-
tisements.All nomInal values were deflated by theConsumer Pice Index
(all items). The maintainedassumption, of course, is that these variable are
uncorrelated with the error term Inequation (20), although correlated with
product price, output, and outputper production worker. There is littleçuestion
about the latter5but theasspcion of zero correlation with the error tarm
in equation (20) is subjectto some doubt. However, given that shortrun,
cyclical deviations from trend aremore lIkely to be demand—induced than
labor—supply_induced, it seems reasonable toassume that these variables
mainly reflect variation in product demand thatiSexogenousto the wage paId
in mamufacturi32
The diagnostic statistics reported in Table 2 are self—explanatory and
require little orrtnent. The only questionable statistic is the Durbin—atson
statistic, which lies toward the upper tail of the inoonclusive region for a
test of positive autocorrelation in the residuals. Equation (20) was also
estimated by a Cochrane—Orcutt procedure to account for the possibility of
autocorrelatd errors, but the resulting estirnate of the auto—correlation
coefficient was only .l19, with a standard error of .211. Further, the
estiaces of all coefficients were virtually unchanged and the standard
errors were ncrcased only slightly when the presence of autbcorrelated
disturbances was allowed for.If autocorrelation is present In true regression
disturbances, it is ncc significant enough to alter an'; conclusions based on
the estItes in Table 2. Therefore the following discussion will focus only
en the estirates showninTable 2.
Conditional on the naintained assunotions underlying equation (20),
the estimates in Table 2 offer support for the Incone insurance hypothesis.
Contrary to the predictions of an auction nodel of the labor narket, percentage
changes in product price do not translate into equal percentage changes in
annual earnings when annual narginal products are held constant. Indeed,
accordIng to the estjnatcs in Table 2, the elasticity of annual earnings with
respect to annual narginal value products is only .221. Thus, for the data
underlying Tables 1 and 2, annual earnings appear to be roughly only one—fifth
as responsive to annual tharginal value products as an auction rnodel of the
36
labor narket wu1d suggest.
This estiiatedrelation between annual earnings and annual arEir.a1value
productscan be used to neasurethe relative variability of employees' annual
rginalvalue products over the sample period. The fitted values f:a equation U)
provideyearlycrtIatcso log?F' + (l—i)lcgEw, where Ew is a quadratic functtn33
oftine. Thus, if these fitted values are regressed on a quadratic functionof
time,the residuals from that regression will measure the percentage de'rLatlon
ofargina1 value products from(quadratic)trend, multIplied by the factor .
Ifthese error teris are then divided by the estiiated '?aridexonentia:ed,
theresultwill be an estimated serIes for employees' marginal value products,
expressed relatIve to trend as in Table 1.
Table 3 below lists these estinated rnarginal value product relatives
for production workers in U.S. manufacturing, 1954 to 1976. For purposes of
comparison, the corresponding relative values of annual earnings of production
workers are reprinted fromTable1. Table 3 also lists the ratios of the
twoseries'yearly values, which can be interpreted as measuring the relative




VALUESOF ANNUAL EARNINGS AND ANNUAL MARGINAL VALUE PRODUCTS
ERESSED RELATIVE TO TREND: U.S. t.NUFACTURING
PRODUCTION OERS 1954—1976
Year AnnualMarginal Annual Earnings Annual EarninEs +
ValueProduct Annual Marginal
VR1UC ?rc'du-r-
1954 .963 .991 1.029
1955—57 1.038 1.012 .975
1958 .904 .981 1.085
1959 1.049 .999 .952
1960—62 .956 .983 1.028
1963—69 1.032 1.009 .978
1970—71 .913 .979 1.072
1972—74 1.053 1.013 .962
1975 .902 .977 1.083
1976 1.025 1.008 .983
Defini:ion cfv3ricis and mrr c'34
Taken together, Tables 1 and 3 offer consistent support for the
income insurance hypothesis. Annual earnings and annual narginal value
38
products are related in the nner suggested by Figure 3. Also, the -
relationbetween layoffs atd the excess of annual earnings overannual
marginal value products is asshownin that figure. At this aggregate level,
the data are strongly consistenc with the hypothesis that firnsreduce the
extent to which wages reflect marginal value products and,consequently, rely
on layoffs to induce separations in periods of low product denand.
More detailed evidence related to this phenonenon ispresented below
in Table 4. Table 4 presents estinates ofequation (20) for eighteen two—
digitU.S. Manufacturing industries.The estimates again are basedon annual
data for the period 1954 to 1976. In basic form, the methodof estimation
used for Table 4 was the same as thatusedfor Table 2. There are thrne diE—
ferecces, however. First, In addition to net new orders andan index of help
wanted newspaper advertisements, the regressionsreported in Table 4 included
as first—stage instrumental variables the logarithms of value addedand average
annual production worker earnings for allmanufacturing industries other than
that for which estimates were being derived.Second, many of the regressions
reported in Table 4 were estimated by a Cochrane—Grcuttprocedure to allow for
autocorrelated disturbances. The decision to correct for first—or second—
order aut0000relation was based on an F—test withsignificance level of .05.
Third, in order to conserve degrees of freedom, theequations underlying
Table 4 imposed the restriction of constantreturns to scale, except where
estinated values of (l—a)(l—') werestatistIcally non—zero a: a signIficance
39 c u
level .05.
The estInaes of equ:Ion (20)prcser.:odinTable ,likethose in
Table 2, support the hvpo thesis that firmsinsure emloyees' earnings. in







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































earningswithrespectto rginal value products, 1,liesmore than t-o
standarderrors below unity. For six of those fourteen,theestimated
value of y lies within two standard errors of zero. Th remaining eight
industries' estimates of 'arefairly uniformly distributed over the ur.i
interval.
Itis interesting to note the diversity in the estImated degrees of Income
insurance present In the industries listed in Table 4.In the absence of any
recognition of labor mobility, one would have to explain this diversity by an
apceal to inter—industry differences in risk aversion on the part of employees
or employers. .Then labor mobility is recognizd, however, these differences
can, at least potentially, be related toobservable variables.
Accordingto equation (11),theresponse of wages to changes in marginal
value products will be smaller as the elasticity of labor. supply to the fi Is
smaller. In :h.presenceof highly inelastic labor supply, the marginal benefit
from a wage reduction will be low, since the marginal labor supplyresponse to
that wage reduction will be low. Therefore, the firm will be discouraged from
varyingwages in response to changes In product demand.
A special case of this general principle occurs when there exIst
fixed costs of interfirm labor mobility which are significant in relation to
the potential benefits from such mobility. For reductions in product demand
sufficiently limited or temporary in nature that the present value of the
benefits fromlabormobility remain less than the cost of Intorfirm mobility,
the relevant elasticity of labor supply to the fi would be determinedby
thedistribution of employees' values of leisure. Ifthat discributianwere
verydense over some small range considerably below the firm's meanwage and
were ofsmall density in the region of the fIrm's reanwage, then:(a) the37
relevant, local elasticity of laborsupply to the firm would be near zero;
and (b) the potential efficiency loss fromlaying off an employee would be
small, sInce the difference between employees' valuesof leisure would be small.
For temporary, limited reductions inproduct demand or extensive fixed costs
of interfi mobilit,, therefore,layoffs would dominate wage reductions as a
means of employment adjustment. It followsthat, for any given distribution
deteining the siae and duration ofshocksto product demand, the larger the
fixed cost of interfi labornobility, the less likely would be a wage—
induced em?loyment response and themore likely would be a response by wayof
layoffs.Also, given any dIstribution of mabilitycosts among fis in an
industry, the larger the average cost ofmobility, the smaller would 1e the
averageresponse of wages to changes in marginal value products.
Thisargument can be extended to the presence of firm—orindust,—
specifichuman capital as well. Interpreting themobility—induced depreciatIon
ofhuman capital as a fixed cost of labormobility, the abovereascning suggests
thatindustries with a greater degree ofspecificity in the human capital of
their employees should have lowerestimated values of y. Further, givenany
positiverelation betweenthe specIfIc and generalcomponents of human capital,
thisreasoning- suggests also that industries withhIgher average annual
40 earnIngs should have lower estimated valuesof y.
Although the evidence is notconclusive, it is interestIng tonote that
theestlmated valuesof y in Table 4 arenegatively related to themean annual
earnings(over the sampleperiod)of prcduction workers in thoseindustries.
A simple regression of theestimated values of y in Table 4 on theaverage reni
annual earnings of productionworkers in the correspondingindustries yields
the results shownbelowin Table 5.38
TABLE 5
ESTIMATESOF THE RELkTION SETEEN ESTIMATED VALUES OF 'FRCTABLE 4
AND MEAN ANNUAL EARNINGS OF PRODUCTION .'ORKERS IN THE
CORRESPONDING INDUSTRY




Coefficient Estimate 1.460 —1.812





DefInition of variables and source: seeAppendix
More directly, Lot the seven industries having estimated values of
-y
less than .15, the average real annual earnings ofproduction workers is equal
to 6173, in comoarison with an average of 4191 for the three Industries
with estimated values of 'greaterthan .83, and an average of 5457 for the
remainingeIght intermediate industries. Thus, on the hypothesis that general
and specific human capital are positively related, the estimates in Table 4
suggest that the extent of income insurance Is greater in industries employing
more highly specific human capital.
This suggestion is made even more strongly when inter—industry variation
in employees' education is accounted for. Holdingaverage annual earnings
constant, an increase in the median level of education In an Indust can be
interpreted as reflecting an increase In the generally marketablecomponent
of employees' human capital relative to the morespecific, less easily
41
marketablecomoncnt.Onthis interpretation, therefore, Industries vith
higher median levels of education should have hIgher estImates of Y39
averageearnings are held constant. Correspondingly, because inter—industry
variation inneanearnings nay reflect differerces ineitherthe general or
specific component of enployees' hunan capital, and becausecontrolling for
educationwould nake inter—industry variationinrrean earnings nore reflective
of inter—industry differences in specifIc hunancapital, any negative relatIon
between mean earnings and es:iated values ofy should be strengthened when
education is controlled for.
As can be seen fron the regression results in Table 6below, the
estImates in Tableare consistent also with this stronger set of hypotheses.
The estited coefficient on nedian education in the aboveregression is
positive and, although statistically significant only at a level of .10,
fairly large relative to the coefficient on nean earnings. Moreover, the
inclusion of nedian education considerably strengthens thees:ia:ed negative
relation between nean earnings and estinated values ofy. By focusing oLly
on education and earnings, alnost forty percent of theinter—industry varia—
ton in estimated values of 'canbe accounted for.
TABLE 6
ESTIMATESOF THE RELATION BETE:; ESTIMATEDVALLTSOF Y FROM TABLE4
ANDMEAN ANNUAL EAF..NINGS AND DIAN YEARS OF SCHOOLING









CoefficIent Estinate —.043 —2.527 1.608
Standard Error (1.149) (.847) (1.158)
R2 .3964
F(2,14) 4.597
DefinitIon of vnriablcs and sourco: seeAppondix40
Evidence of the relation between income insurance arid specific human
capital also can be seen in the relation between the estimated values of '
inTable 4 and the median job tenure of male emoloyees in thecorresponding
industries. On the assumption that inter—industry variation in medianjob
tenure reflects inter—industry differences in human capital specificity,
the previous discussion would suggest a negative relation betweenestimated
values of y and median job tenure. The estimates in Table4 areclearly
consistent with this hypothesis, as can be seen from the regression results
shown below in Table 7.Overone—fourth of the inter—industry varIation in
estimated values of y can be explained byinter—Industry variation in median
job tenure.
TABLE7
ESTIMATESOF THERELATION BETWEEN ESTIMATED VALUES OF r FROMTABLE4
AND MEDIAN JOB TENURE OFMALE EMELOYZES IN THE
CORRESPONDING INDUSTRY
=a+n Median Tenure 01
Coefficient a
Coefficient Estimate .920 —.779





Definition of variables and source: see Appendix
The estimated values of y in Table 4 reflect alsoon the relevance of
equation (11—8) in explaining inter—industry differences inlayoff rates..
As discud i Section1the presence of income insurance implies the
useoflayoffs as a means of reducing employment in perIods ofsufficInly41
low product dernand.Further,the greater the degree of incone insurance,the
higher would be the critical state of dear.dbelow which layoffs becone Dositive.
Consequezitly, for any given interfjrn distribution ofproduc demand, industries
with higher average degrees of incomeinsurance also would have higheraverage
layoff rates.
With reference to Table 4, the irplication ofthese considerations is
that estimated values ofy should be negatively related to average layoffrates,
ceceris paribus. Marginal evidence of thisrelation can be seen below in
Table8. As the estlates belowsuggest, industries in whch.1ayoffs corprise
a larger share of total separations tendto have higher degrees of income
insurance (lower estina:ed values ofr).Equivalent'y,industries with high
degrees of incone insurance tend to rely more onlayoffs to achieve a
given level of separations.
TLE8
ESTIMATES OF THE ?L.TION BETEN ESTIMATED VUESOF 'FROMTA3LE 4
AND AVERAGE MONTHLY LAYOFF AND SEPARATION RATES INTHE
CORRESPONDI.NC INDUSTRY









Standard Error (.321) (1.704) (.996)
R2 .1506
F(2,15) 1.330
DefinitIon of variables and source:see Appendix
Also,for a given average level of layoffs,industries wIth higher
average levels of se'aratjons tend to have hIgier estImatedvalues of y.42
In part, this mayreflect thefact that industries with hIgher average levels
of voluntary separations are those with relatively low degrees ofspecificity
inemployees' human cooltal. Eut it may also reflect thefact that industries
with higher values of y.are more likely to respond toreductionsin product
demandby the use of wage reductions and so have higher average levels of
voluntary separations.
The estimated values of ypresented in Table 4are entirely consistent
with the income insurance hypothesis. In absolute value, they are as the
thoory predicts, and perhaps more importantly, they vary across industries in
a manner implied by the theory. Further, they appear to be related to inter—
industry differences in layoff rates as the theory suggests they should be.
In conjunctIon with Tables 1, 2, and 3, the evidence contained in Table 4
appears to warrant acceptance of the hypothesis that flrms stabilize the
income of theIr emoloyces in a manner sImIlar to that describedby equation (ll)."
The empirical analysis in this section suggests that firms supply
income insurance to their employees by reducing the extent to which
wages reflect marginal value products, and that firms consequently rely
on layoffs to reduce employment in states of sufficiently low product
demand. However, these results are based on a sequence of within—year
comparisons of earnings and marginal value products. The analysis In
this section has not considered either the dynamic or longer—term
implications of the theory developed in Section I. The following section
considers these imolicatlons and Interprets the previous results within
the broader context vhich these implications provide.43
III.How Close to an Auction is the Labor Market?
Perhaps the most striking empirical finding of the' previous sectcn
is the low estimated response ofearnings tomarginalvalue products. This
low responseseems to indicate that the labor market differs considerably
froman auction, at least on a year—to—year basis. Whether the labor market
differsfrom an auction on any longer—term basis remains to be seen, however.
In part, the low estimated values of I in Tables 2 and 4 can be actri-
buted to the inclusion of a tine trend in equation (20). With a time
trend included in the regression, the estImated value of I reflects the move—
ment of wages relative to trend that is induced by movements of marginal value
products relative to :rend. it does not reflect any longer tern relation
between wages and marginal value products that night be Impounded in the tine
trend. Thus, the low estimated values for I in equation (20) arc not
tecessarily ir'consistent with a longer—tern, trend equality of wages and
marginalvalue products.
Thisdistinction between short—run and long—ran suggests that while
estimates of equation (20) may reflect the presence of income insurance,
they may not adequately describe the long—run characteristics of income
insurance. Equation (20) assumes that employees'wage expectations are
exogenous. However, with any sort of endogenous, lagged adjustment of wage
expectations, such an assumption requires estImates of that equation to be
interpreted only within an explicitly short—run context. Given enoughtIne
to adjust,orgivenenough forewarning, the utility loss suffered by eplcyees
as a result of initially unexpected changes iflincomeiht be expected to
approachzero. Thic fact ugostc that the recoonsc of ves to chane
in marginal value products mightbedistributed over tine, and that the
long—run response nigh: differ substantially from the short—ternres?onse.
Indeed, ecuatton (19) ossumos that the "long—run" elasticity ofges44
with respect to (fully anticipated) changes in .arginal value products Is
unity. So long as expected wages change In proportion- to marginal value
products, wages also willchangein proportion to nargirial value products.
Defining the long run as a period long enough for exoectatlons toadjustfully,
the estimated "short—run" values of yinTables 2 and 4 are entirely consistent
with a long—run view of the labor narketasan auction.
To elaborate with a specific exanple, assurne that eoloyees' wage
expectations evolve according to the adaptive schene
(21) Ew(t) =Aw(t—l)+ (l—X)Ev(t—l)
In this case, by using equation (19) to express Ew(t—l) as a function
ofPF'(t—l) and w(t—l), and then substituting this expression into
equation (21) to express Ew(t) as a function of those sàe varIables,
equation (19) can be rewritten as
(22) log[w(t)J =ylog[P(t)]+log[ F(t) J+y(1—)(l—vJlogEF(t)]
N(t) v
—y(l—X)log[P(t--l) ]—(l—X)logF(t—1) ]—y[l—] [1—.] (l—X)logfF(t—1)]
C N(t—l) o
+(l—Xy)logfw(t—l)]+u
It can be seen fron equation (22) that, so long as neither y nor A
is equal to unity, the effect on wages of a change in narginal.valueproducts
will be distributed over ti'e.For equation (22) ,theshort—te elasticity
ofwages withrespect to rginal value products isequalto y, whIle the
long—run elasticity (found by setting w =E;in equation [19]) Sequal
tounity.ly in the case where y or A ecuals unity will shorz—run and
long—run elasticItIes coincide.45
If the labor market operated as artaucti.nfor all time intervals,
thenestimates of y from equaion (22) should be near unity, while estimated
coefficIents on lagged variables should be near zero. Alternatively, if
the labor market operated as equation (20) implies, with no endogenity
of wage expectations, then estimated values ofy from equation (22) should
be less than uqicy, while estirnated coeffients on lagged variablesagain
should be near zero. Finally, if employees'wage expectatiris were ertdcgencus,
so that employee aversion to initially unexpected income changes dinished
with the extent of forewarning, then estimates ofy from equation (22) should
be less than unity, while estimated coefficientson lagged variables should
be non—zero and indicative of the time—distributedpattern of wage adjustment
in response to changes in marginal value products.
Presented below in Table 9 are estimates fromequation (22) based
on the same data as underlIe Tables 1, 2, and 3.
TABLE9
ESTIMATESOF EQUATI0 (22) FOR U.S. MA1JPACTTRINc, 1954—1976






Coefficient Estimate —.634 .402 .766 —.116 —.588 .714




Defint1o of virjab1es and source:see Appendix46
I is interesting to note that, although there isno a priori justi—
fication for equation (21)as a description ofemployee' expectations, the
estinated coefficients on current price, laggedprice, and lagged wage in
equation (22) come very close to satisfying the restrictionsimplied by
equations (19) arid (21). According to equatIon (22), the sun of the
coefficIents on current price, lagged price, andlagged wage should be equal
to unity. The sun of the estlates of those coefficientsfrom Table 9 is equal
to 1.0005. Hoc.'ever, the estimated coefficientson current and lagged output
per production worker are less consistent with the restrictionsin1ied by
equation (22). According to that equation, the ratIo ofthe coefficients
on currant price and current outputper production worker should equal the
ratio of the coefficients on laggedprice and lagged output per production
worker. For the estimates in Table 9, the foerratio is equal to .52, while
the latter ratio is equal to .197.However, an increase n the estimated
coefficient on lagged price of less than threefourthsof its standard error
would equate the two ratios. Thus, although theestimated coefficients in
Table 9 are not exactly consistent with theinterpretation given them by
equation (22), they are close enough tosuggest that equation (21) might provide
a reasonable apProximation to the evolution ofemployees' wage expectations
147
over tine.
This interpretation of the estimates in Table9 is subject to two
questions. First, it is possible that the estimated coefficentson
lagged varIables simply reflect the effects of aucocorrelateddisturbances.
Second, the general fo of equation (22) is consistentwith interpretations
other than that suggested by equatIons (19) and(21)
To address the fIrst question, r.ocice chat if theprover cpecficacion
of equatIon (10) were ivcn by47
(23)log(w(t)) —C +y1og[P(t)1+y1og[F(t) 3+u(C)
0
where: u(t) =ou(-l)+v(t)
then, written in autoregressive form, equation (19) would become




which is identical in form to equation (22), but which iplias different
restrictions on the estimated coefficIents. In particular, If equacion(23)
is true, the product of the estimated ccefuicients on currentprice and
lagged wage should equal the negative.of the coefficient on lagged price,-
andthe product of the coefficients on currentoutput per production
worker and lagged wage should equal the negative of the coefficienton
lagged output per produduccion worker. Thus, the estimated co€fficientsin
is Table 9 can provIde a basis for distinguishing betweenequations (22) and (2).
But on this subject, the evidence provided by Table 9 is mixed. In
absolute value, theproductof the coefficients on current price and lagged
wage exceed the coefficient cn lagged price by .171, a difference which is
almost exactly consistent with equation (22).In contrast, the product O
thecoefficients on current output per prcducticn worker and lagged
wage differ from the coefficient on lagged output per production worker by
only .041, a difference more consistent with equation (24) than with
equation (22). Further, any use of the ectimates in Table 9 to dIs:ingush48
between equations (22) and (26) is hapered by the fact that the inplicacions
of the two equations are too similar for the data underlying Table 9 to allow
a test with rnuch power. However, a Durbin h—test for serial correlation
yields a value of .602, which is significant only at a level of .275. Thus,
although the estimates in Table 9 should be interpreted with cautIon, it
appears reasonable at this stage to interpret thei as iore than the result of
isspecificacion, and to interpret th•e as they stand.
The second question rentioned above is less easily addressed. There
is rio guarantee that estiriated coeffIcients fron equation (22) do not sinoly
reflect costs of wage adjustnent that have nothing to do with eloyees'
aversion to income uncertainty. Thus, although the estir.ates frc equation (22)
(and equation [20, for that macter) are consistent with the inco insurance
hypothesis, they cannot be taken as conclusive proof that incoe insurarca
50
exists.
Nevertheless, regardless of the true underlying structure of wage
adjusenent and employees' wage ecpectat±ons, equation (22) an be justIfied
on the 'ore general grounds that it is caable of approxiating a wide
variety of distributed lag patterns for the effectof changes in rginal
valueproducts on current and subsequent wages. Ex post, it can be justified
on the grounds thatItfits the data as eli as do nodels which allow for
tore complicated lag structures. Thus, one need not accept the interpre-
tation of equation (22) iolied by equations (19) and (21) in order to
accept equation (22) as a reasonable basis for estizating the t1e—distrIbu:ed
response of wages Co changes in nargil vzlue products, and for testing
whether the long—run resoonseofwages to arginai value oroducts differs
fron the short—run rosDonsein an3riner consistent with the incoc irsuronco
hypothesis.49
Therefore, consider the implications of the estinates in Table 9for
the time-distributed resoense ofwages to changes in m:ginal value products.
The estimated coefficient of .402 on currentproduct price indicates that,
holding the previous year's wage and marginal value productconstant, a
ten percent increase in product price would lead toa four percent increase
in wages. In the followingyear, assuming that product price remained at
its current level and assuming for siz1jjythat marginal products
remained constant, wages would rise byan additional .171 percent (equal
to w(t+l) + w(t÷l) w(t) ). the sane assumptions, wages would inarease
3w(t) P(c)
in the next period by a further .714 of .171percent (equal to
w(t±2) [3w(t1)+w(t+l)..(t)]) ,andso on. Ultimately, the complete
3w(t+l) ?(t)3w(t) ?(:)
long—run response of wages would be given by fw(t)±3w(t)]![l—w(t
P(t) P(t—1)
which for these data is ecual to 1.0015.That is, the escated coefficients
from equation (22) imply that thelong—run elasticity of wages with respect
to marginal value products Is unity,just as an auc:on model of the labor
market would predict. The short—runelasticity of .402 is sigrif.cant1y
lower, however, and is consistent with the incomeinsurance hypothesis.2
The question "How close to an auction isthe labor market?", then,
is perhaps better posed as "Howlong does it take wages to respond to changes
in marginal value productsas they would res?ond in an auction market?" The
estimated coefficients from equation (22)provide an answer to this question.
Listed below in Table 10 are variousmeasures (implied by the estImates in
Table 9) of th effects ofchanges in annual marginal value products on
current and subcequenc annualearnIngs.
Column one of Table 10 LIsts the estimatedeffect on earnings at time t
of a permanent, unit increasein margInal value products at tInezero. Column50
two lists the cumulative totals of these effects at tine t,dividedby the
niber t+l. Colunn three is der±ved fron colunn one by nul:iplyin the
elenents of colunn one by the factor (1+r)_t, where r is assuned equal
.10. Colunn four lists the curaulative totals of colunn three, divided by
t
the factors (1+rYi, where r is again assuned equal to .10.
•j =0
TABLE10
ESTIMATEDEFFECTS OF A PERNENT, UNIT INCREASE IN NUAL RCINAL
VALU: PRODUCTS ON SUESEQtJENT ANNJAL EARNINCS ?XD REALIZED
WEALTH: U.S. MANUFACTURINC 1954—1975
Period Direct EffectCurulated Effect DiscountedCunulated Discountd
as a Percentage Direct Direct fectas a
of Auction Effect Percentage ofAuctian
Market Effect Market Effect
0 .402 .402 .402 .402
1 .573 .488 .521 .483
2 .695 .557 .574 .547
3 .782 .613 .587 .598
4 .844 .659 .576 .638
5 .888 .697 .551 .670
10 .979 .814 .378 .762
15 .996
— .869 .238 .801
.
20 .998 .900 .149
Defirtion of variables and source: see Appendix
As colunn one of Table 10 shows, alnost eighty—fIvepercent of the
unit—elastic resonse of wages to changes In narginal valueproducts is
achieved within fiveyearsof the initial shock. Alnost ninety percent is
achieved withIn six years. The nean lag for the effect ofa change in nargicl
value products on wages is equal to 1.811years, and, ascolunnone clearly51
shows, the distributIon of lagged effects is heavily weighted toward short
lags. Thus, although the labor narkec appears not to operate as an auctIon
in a short—run sense, these data indicate that, at the nargin, it nay be
reasonably toodeled as an auction for tine Intervals on theorderof five
years' length.
But while the "narginal" deviation of wages fran narginal value products
dininishes fairly rapidly, the cunulative deviation renains. Thus, while a
pernanent ten percent increase in rnarginal value products would lead to an
8.8 percent increase in wages by the end of those six years (column one), the
cu.ulacive effect on wages over those six years would be only seventypercent
of the cunulative increase in narginal value products (colunn two). Dis-
counted at a rate of ten percent, thepresentvalue of the cunulated effect
on wages would be only sixty—seven percent of the cu.ulated increase in
rginal value oroducts (colunn four). Cunulating over a twenty year period,
the present value of the futue wage changes induced by a peanent, tiie—
zero Increas.e in narginal value products would be equal to ninety percent of
the auction result at a zero rate of interest (colunn two),andequal to only
eighty—two percent of the auction result at a ten percent rate of interest
(column four).
As the estinates in--Table 10 show, the labor narkac returns fairly
rapIdly to the equality of wages and narginal value products. But the interin
period of inequality between wages and narginal value products reduces the
wealth effect corresponding to any given peranent change in narginal value
products by ten to twenty percent. Although the effects of incone Insurance
on enployee incone and the allocatIon of labor disappear in the longrun, r"e
stabillzjr.g effect on eplovecs' realized wealth renains. In ans;;er to the52
question posed by this sectIon, the analysis indicates that the labor market
does operate as an auction, but withanadjustment Derlod of around six years.
This period of partial adjustcnz reduces the potential variability of
employees' realized wealth by approxirnately ten to twenty percent. In the
short—run, thelabormarket appears to differ fromanauctIon market both in
terms of factor rewards and in terms of factor allocatIon. In the long—run,
it appears to differ only in termsofrealized wealth.53
Appendix. Sources and Definitions of Variables Used in the Enpirical Analysis
Listedbelowby table are sources and definitions for the variables
referred to in the text.
Table 1, oae24
Relative values for profit per production worker, annual earnings of
production workers, and value—added per production worker were constructed
by regressing the logarithn of the variable in question on a constant, tine,
and tine squared, averaging the deviations within the given periods, and then
exonentiating those averages. The relative values for layoff rates were
constructed by regressing the layoff rate on a constant, tIne,andtine scuared,
exoressing the actual values relative to fitted values, and then taking a
geoet:ic average of those relative values within the given periods.
"Real" values were formedbydeflating nominal values by the Consuner
Price Index (all iters).
Datafor production workers (as opposed to all employees) were chosen
to avoid possible biases due to cyclical changes in the composition of
manufacturing employment.
Annual values of residual income (before taxes) were
taken from various issues of U.S. Federal Trade Comission, Quarterly
FinancIal Reort for nufacturin, inin2,andTrade CorDorations,
Table Al, "Income Statement for CorporatIons Included in:"
Annualvalues of production worker ecploent, productIon worker
earnings,and value added were taken fromtheU.S. Departcnt of Ccerce,
Bureau of the Census 1972 Census of-anufactures and from the1974 and175
Annual Survey of nufactures,General Statistics for Industry Groups and54
Industries. Annual averages of monthlylayoffrates were taken frcn U.S.
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics Enolo-nent and Earnirvzs,
1909—1975 and recent issues of Eolov-en:andEarnings.
Thesesources apply both for two-digit industries and for the aggregate
of all nanu.facturing industries.
Table 2, page 30
The variable w(t) was formed by taking the ratio of annual wage paynents
to production workers and annual eploynenc of production workers (sources
listed above for Table 1).
The variable P(t) was foed by taking the ratio of annual value—added
to an indexofindustrial production, (F(t))(sources listed above for Table 1)
Annual indices cf industrial production were taken fran: Board off
Governors of the Federal Reserze Sysce, IndustrIal Product±cr: 1976 revision.
Annual values of net new orders for nanufacturing corporatiofls and n
index of help—wanted newspaper advertienents were taken fran Business
Statistics: 1977 Suc1ement to the Survey of Current Business.
Table 3, paze 33
Sources and definitions are listed above for Tables 1 and 2. The
derivatIon of colunn one is discussed in the text.
Table4, ae 35
Sources and definitions arelisted above for Tables 1 and 2.
Table5, Daze38
Moanannualearnings for each industry (except 21)were conputed by
averagIngthevariablew(t) forthe years 1954 through 1976.
Table 6, ;ae 39
Values of nedian years of schcoilng for eachindustry (except 21,for55
which datawere notavailable) were taken from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
SDecial Labor Farce Reort ff103: Educational Attainent of Workers, March1568.
Other sources and defintons are listed above for Tables 1, 2, and 5. Education
is measured in 10—year units.
Table 7, page 40
Values of rnedian job tenure of male ecloyees for each industry (excapt 21,
forwhich data were not available) were taken franU.S.Bureauof Labor
Statistics, Special Labor Force ReDor: p112: Job Tenure of Workers, January
1968.Other sources and definitions are listed above for Tibles 1, 2, 5, and 6.
Tenure is measured in 10—year units.
Table 8, pate 41
nualaverages of ncnthly layoff and searation races were taken f:o
U.S.Departnenc of Labor, Bureau of Labor StatIstIcs, E:lo'ent and Eanins,
1909—1975and recent issues of Enplo'rnerit and Earnns.Theseannual averages
were then averaged over the period 1954 through 1976.
Table 9, rage 45
Sources and definitIons are listed above for Table 2.
Table 10, page 50
These estlnaces areip1ied by the esc!ced coefficients in Table 9.
For sources and definitions of the underlying varIables, seethe
listing for Table 2 above. For a description of the nechod by which these
estinateswere foed, see the text.56
FOOTNOTES
1
See, for exanole, the work of Azariadls (1975, 1976, 1978), Ba1y (1974),
1977, 1977), Feldsccin (1974, 1975, 1976, 1978), Gordon, Grossn..an, Pole—
marchakis, and Polemarchakis and Weiss.
2
In thIs context, see the papers by Azariadis, Sally (1974), Grossn,
Gordon, •Polenarchakis, and Polenarchakis and Weiss, listed above.
3
See, for example, Azariadis (1975, 1976), Sally (1974), and Poiearchais.
though these authors recognize chat state—invariant wages might not be
optimal wherewages influencethe ex post allocatIon of labor among firms,
their analyses do not relax the separation of cx post intcrfiwage dif-
ferences and cx cost interfirm labor mobility, and do not explore ch
determination of optimi wages and layoffs in situations where completely
state invariant wages are not optimal. Some previous authorshaveallowed
for ex post interfirm labor mobility and ex cost wage variability (see, for
example, Grossman, and Akerlot and iyazaki), but as yet the optimal extent
of ex post vage variability has not been analyzed.
4
Akerlof and Mlyazaki also have madethispoint.
5
-
Nocredit can be claimed for the basic structure of the odel that
is developed in this section. In major respects it is identical to that
developed by Sally (1974) and Azariadis (1975). However, the extension of
this model to allow for cx post interfirm labor nobility is original to
this author. For a first analysis along these lines, see Brown(1976).
6
Although identical in productivity at their current employment, emloyees
of the fi may differ in ptoductive characteris•tics of value elsewhere. Con-
sequently, there may b a distribution of best alternative employments and
alternative earnings among the firm's enloyees. If the firm's employees are
assumed to be identical in all respects, this distribution should be inter—
preted as a short run phenomenon due to limited information.
The presence of severance pay in this model constitutes a second !mortant
departure from the assumptions standard in previous analyses of income—insuring
labor contracts. Non—wage pavrzents to laid—off workers are a widespread prac:ce,
but their inclusion in the model does more than sim1y add realism to the ana..ysis.
The existence of such state—contingent suc1enen:ary payments significantly
alters the implications of the model with rosect to both the extent and mix of
wage reductions and la'offs which the firm makes in states of slackproduct
demand. It can be shown, in fact, that such pavmn:s are necessary iflayoffs
are to be an element of the oo:imal contract. Further, the model crovides a
naturaljustification for such payments in theIr effect cm the cctimal derre-2
of efficiency in oroductic: and resource allocation. The absence of such payen3
inpreviousanalysesis scmewhat puzzling, giventhat such aymcn:s novcm—
siderably reducethe degree ofinccmeuncertainty implied by any given degree
ofemploymentumccr:ainv.57
.7
An alternative assumption would be that the firm pays all employees
laid off in a given state some fixed payment independent of the value of the
nextbestalternativewhich is realized. This alternative assummtion was re-
jected for two reasons. First, it would not allow the firm to stabilize emloyee
income as effectively as does the separation pay policy assumed in the text.
It therefore appears that this alternative policy would be dominated bya
policy of the sort assumed in the text,atleast within the context of the assurao—
tioris underlying the present analysis. Second, given the limitationsirapcsed by
the single—period framework of the model developed in thetext, the separation
pay policy assumed does a better job of approximating the manner in which paments
made to laid off workers depend on those workers' realized alternatives(e.g.,
on how long workers remain unemployed before beingreemployed).
8
For simplicity, the analysis assumes that a unique distribution of
demand at other firms exists, and that the realized state of dend for the
firm's product is simply a drawing from this distribution. This assumption
makes the supply of labor to the firmdeterministic within each state of
demand for the firm's product, and it insures that maximizing over all states
of own product dem.and is the same as maximizing over all distributions of
demand.
Letting f(v) denote the probability density function for alternative
earnings within the fi's initial labor force, N(s) would be given by
A (s )+c
If(v)dv,where A(s) =(l—.(s))w(s)--.A(s)g(s),where c denotes a
0
fixed cost of interfirm mobility, and where ,(s), u(s),andg(s) are as
defined below.
10
Again letting f(v) denote the probability density function for
alternative earnings within the firm' initial labor force,w (s) would
be given by
A(s)+c
I(v-c)f(v)dv I f(v)dv, where A(s) is as defined above.
0 0
11Given the utility function U(w), the level ofutility corresponding




Dividing by U'(Ew) yields
2
IJ(w) [U(Ew)—EwJ+w+1U"(Ew) (w-Ew)
1J'(Ew) U'(Ew) 2 U'(Ew)
Interpreting equation (2) as an expected—utility—constant constraint, it can
be seen from this last expression that L(w(s) is equivalent to 1______
2U'(E')
The expected value of this term can be interpreted as the risk premium
which the firm must pay its employees in order to attract them at the
start of the period, given the wage and employment schedule :hich it offers
its employees. Employee aversion to income uncertainty implies that L(w)
will increase as w diverges from its cx ante mean level. Thus, the firm's
risk premiwa will increase as the uncertainty of the incce prospect
which It offers its eamloyces increases.58
12
Defining f(v) and A(s) as above, w (s) is given by
q
f(v—c)f(v)dv+If(v)dv
Again defIning f(v) and A(s) as above, L(s) is given by
/ L(v-c)f(v)dv f f(v)dv
14
This implication follows from the fact that theexpected marginal value
product of employees is diminishing in N, while expectedcosts of future relo-
cation are increasing in N. Because the expectednet risk—adjusted joint income
of fIrms and employees is diminishing in N,equality at the margin will maximize
the expected value of current and futureaggregate net risk—adjusted income.
15
More precisely, conditions (6)—(9) joIntly deteinestate—s income and
employment for initial employees, but condition (6) doesso only indirectly
through its effect on employees' marginal products. Thefollowing analysis abstracts from randomness in the supplycurve of new hires and assumes that
the supoly curve of new hires is notinfinitl'j elastic.
16
Condition (6) is, of course, only trivially operative forstates of
demand In which additional hires are zero. In suchstates, if layoffs also
are zero, condition (7) alone determines the optimalwage and, imülicitly,
optimal employment. If layoffs are positIve, conditions (7)—(9)are determinin&.
17
Condition (10) is derived from condition (7)by setting ,(s)equalto
zero in condition (7) and by noting that A(s) isequal to w(s) when )(s) is
equal to zero.
18These conditfons are not extreme. Tne elasticity of labor sup1v
to the firm will diminish as the firm's wage diverges from its mean value
if the density of the alternative wage distribution among the firm's employ—
eesIs greatest atthe mean wage and falls as the firm'swageapproaches
extreme values. The marginal risk premium, dL(w(s))/dw(s), i11 increase
in absolute value as the firm's wage diverges from its mean ir employees




This result follows from the fact that, defIning L()asabove, dL(g(s))/dg(g)is equal to zero only ifg(s)is equal to Ew.59
20
It is easily seen that conditions (7) arid (8) both reduce to condicon (10)
when g(s) is set equal to u(s).
To understand this result, notice that the firm's payments to its eriloyees
are made responsive to product price only because of che effect of those payments
on the labor supply realized by the firm. Now, after all quits for the period
have occurred, and given the assumption embodied in the model that supplemental
payments made to laid off workers do not influence those workers' search behavior,
supplemental payments to laid off workers induce no labor SuPply response.
Consequently, there is no reason not to eliminate that income uncertainty uhicri
results from being laid off, given that state s has occurred arid given that the
employee has riot quit in state s..The optimal poiicy therezore makes employees
indifferent to being laid off in any particular state.
This result rests on the assumPtion that severance payments de to laid
off workers do no: influence those workers' search behavior. Inthe absence of
thi.sassumption,it would not generally be profitable for severancepayments
Co eliminate the income loss associated with layoff status.
21
Because this result rests on the ecuality of g(s) with u(s), it rests
also on the assumptions underlying that equality.
22
The optimal layoff policy in the presence of fullyco.pensating
severance payments provides an interesting contrast to the optimal layoff
policies in models for which severance pay is riot an element of the labor
contract (see, for example, Sally (1976) and Azariadis (1975, 1976).
If severance pay is assumed not to exist, then the firm'slayoff strategy
will be directly inf1unced by employees' aversion to inéomeuncertainty.
In the absence of severance payments, the firm will hoard laborin periods
of slack product demand in order to mke work at the fimore attractive
to current and prospective employees. The firm's layoffstrategy will
therefore be less efficient from the standpoint of production andresource
allocation, sacrificin; some productive efficiency Luordorto reduce
income undertainty for emoloyees. It uill not generally beprofitable
for the firm to eliminate the risk of layoff, however, andso the fIrm
will have to pay some premium to its employees in the form ofhigher
mean earnings in order to compensate for whatever risk reains. This
premium would be reduced if the fIrm were to make severancepaents
to its employees. It could be eliminated if thoseseverance payments
were fully compensating, as assumed in the text.
The relative allocatjve inefficiency implied by a layoff diminishes
as the firm's wage is reduced because the difference u—E(vlv<w}dimInishes
as thefirms wage is reduced.
24




Now, suppose that u(s) were reduced (e.g., in order to reduce theextent
of unexected wace incronscs in states ofhighdemar.d)andc(s) ncroasod soas to keep employmentconstant. In this casethefollowing would be true
i(s)+h(s)d(h(s)) >P(s)F'(s), ,, 1.-.60
andh(s) wouldbe reduced to restore equilibrium. Alternatively, if w(s)
were Increased (e.g. in order to reduce the extent of unexpected wage
reduction in states of low demad) and h(s). reduced soasto keep employ—
ment constant, the following inequality would result -
ii(s)+h(s)du(hCs))<P(s)F'(s),
dh(s)
andh(s) wouldbeincreasedto restore equilibrIum. In either case, it would
notbeoptimal to fully offset the effect of a change In the wage paid to
initial enployees. Only If i(s) were independent of h(s) would complete
offsetting be optimal.
25
Panel (b) assumes a stable distribution of alternativewages among
the firm's employees, while panel (d) assumes a stablesupply curve of
new hires to the fim. -
26
A precise descrIption of the manner in which the numbers presented
iTable1 were derived ca be found in the appendix.
27 —. Forthe Conb—Douglas production function, F(,N) zKN ,annual
residual income per emnlcyee in the absence of income insurance would be
given by (l—e—)( )/N, and annual earnings per employee would be given by
PF( )/N. Taking the coefficient of variation as a neasure of percentage
variability, itcanbe seen from these expressions that in the absence of
income insurance, the percentage variability of annual earnings and annual
residual income per employee would be ecual, and equal also to the percen-
tage variability of value—added per employee. At the opposite extreme, if
firmscompletely stabilized the wage income of their employees, residual income
per employee would be given by (l—g)PF( )/N —, wheredenotes the stabilized level
of wage paents per em1oyee. It is easily seen from this expression that
in the presence of such complete Income insurance, the percentage
variability of residual income per emloyee (again measured by the
coefficient of variation) would exceed the percentage variability of
value added per employee by a factor equal to one plus the ratio of
labor earnings to residual income.
28
For an alternative explanation which focuseson the role of unemplovnent
Insurance and imperfect experiencerating in encouraging layoffs, see Belly (1977a,
l977b),Srechling, and Feldsteiri (l974 1975, 1976, 1978).
29
For the CES production function given by
_9 —p--v/p
F(K,N) =A[fK÷(l—) ]




—p/v(p+v)/v —(l+p) PF A PF() K
K
Using these expressions in the definition of profits yields
PF(K,N)—PF K—PF I =(l—v)FF(K,N).
K N
Residual income in the absence of income insurance would be DrOortiOna1 to
value added. Thus, residual income cer production worker would be proportical
to value added per production worker in the absence of incomo insurance, and
both would have the same percentage variability.
30
This is not a general result, but it is true- forthe data underlying
Table 1.
Fora discussion of this sublect, see Nerlove and the works cited therein.
Alsosee Criliches (1967), Lucas, and Mayor.
32
Expression (17) is derived from (lô)bv substituting Rlcg[w(s)/Ew] in
place of dL(w(s))/dw(s), and c in place of dogN(s)/diogw(s). For an
example in which the assumption of dL(w(s))/dw(s) =Rlogf(s)/Ew]would be
approoriate, consider the logarithmic utility function U K1ogwj. Recall
that L(w(s)) is equal to —i U"(Ew)[w(s)—Ew}2. For the logarithmic utility
2 U'(Ew)
functionthis term would be equal to 1 fw(s)—Ew]2, and so dL(w(s))/dw(s)
-
2Ew
would equal [w(s)—EwJ/Ew, whichis approximately equal to logfw(s)/Ew}.
Inthis case, R is equal to one.
33
Approximation (18) results from substitutIng into approximation (17)
the logarithm of the expression forPFN in footnote29.
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The Arrow—Chenery—Minhas—Solow equation estImates the elasticIty
of substitution in the following fashion:
log(F(t)/N(t)) =constant+alog[w(t)/P(t))u
t
Thisformulation follows from setting w =PFand v=l in the expression
N
for?Fin fcotr.ote 29. Fora more detaIled discus1cn of t.s suect,
U
see Arrow, et a!.
3
This statement is basad on an F—tcsc wtthasignificance level of •o62
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This limited degree of response applies to annual averages of hourly
and weekly earnings as well. Empirical evidence of this fact is available
from the author upon request.
37
The ratio of the relative values of annual earnings and annual marginal
value products will equal the ratio of their absolute values ifannualearnings
and annual marginal value products follow the same trend. Equation (20) imolies
that they do follow the same trend.
38
This statement interprets the "contracting period" of Section I
to be of one year's length.
-
39
The estimated coefficients presented in Table 4 do not differ significantly
from those that allow for non—constant returns so scale in all industries. Also,
they do not differ significantly from estimates based onannualaverages of
hourly or weekly earnings. Thecompleteset of estimates from which those
presented in Table 4 are drawn is available from the author upon request.
40
See Mincer for evidence that general and specific human capital are
positively related.
41
See Parsons for a development of this argument.
It is interesting to note that the estimated values of 'inTable
bear no systematic relation to the percentage ofworkersunionizedinthe
corresponding industries. In contrast, empirical work from Lewis to4edoff
suggests a negative relation.
These conclusions are not altered when different sets of estimated
values of y are chosen. Alternative versions of Tables 5— corresponding
to different sets of estinated values of y are available from the author
upon requcst.
For example, if the time—series behavior of marginal value products
were given by
PF'(t) =a+a t-f-at2+u,Eu=0 01 2 tt
andif employees' wages in the presence of income insurance were given by
=a+a t+a
01 2
then estimates of equation (20) would indicate non—ecuality of wares and
marginal value products even though longer—term, trend ecuality existed. I:
iSworth repeatingshic thefollowinganalysis interprets the "contracting'
period as beingof one year'slength, and thus equates"wages"with annual
earnings.63
No claim of origInality is made here. For a previous example of
thisframework, see Cagan. This expectations model is assumed only for
the purpose of illustration. It will not generally bean unbiased
predictor of future wages. For a discussion of thispoint, see Muth.
Theestimates presented in Table 9 assume constant returnsto scale
in order to conserve degrees of reedo.An F—test for thesignificanceof current and lagged output in a value of only .581.
L7
At this stage, one couldre—estimate equatIon (22) wIth the Implied restrictjorjQsed on the coefficientestintes, and then oerform an F—test for the consistency of therestrjctjowch the data. Because thisanalysis isnot directly concerned withthe exacts:ructural description of en1oyees'
wage expectations, but rather isconcerned nly with thereduced—form discribued lagrelation between wages andmarginal valueproducts, such an elaboration is bypassed.
See Griliches(l967) for a discussion of thispoint. flotIce that equations (22) and (24) assumeconstant returns to scale.
49
Strictlyspeaking, the h—test is a large sample test;therefore, the h—statistic should be inter?reted jthsome cautIon in this context. It
should also be floted that the coefficientestimates in Table 9 are not




Fora discussjc related to thispoint, seeayersandThaler.
51
Introducing additional lags Intoequation (22) doesnot significantly increasethe explanatory power of theequation.
52 -
Incomparison with the estimatespresentedinTable 2, those in Table 9 indicate alargerwithin—year response of wages tochanges inmarginalvalue products.However, the qualitative implicatIonsofthe two equations are the same.Regardless ofthespecific assumptions maintained aboutthe form of employees' exPectationswages aDpear todiffersubstantially from marginal value products intheshort—run.
Iotice thatif equation(22) werethetruemodel,and yetequation(20) wereestimated, the coefficients ontime andtime squaredwould pickup the effectsof the omitted laggedvariables.Iftheseomitted variables werewell—describedby a quadratic tine trend (theyare), then the estimated valuesofyfrom such a misspecjfjedequation would notdiffer too greatly from those of acorrectly soecified ecuacion.Althoughtheestimated valuesof y fromequatic5 (0) and (22)differ,they are sImilar enough tosuggest that their difference fromunity is notthe result of nisspeci— fication.614.
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